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This paper addresses the important question of whether public investment spending on economic infrastructure 
enhances economic growth and labor productivity in Argentina. Following the lead of the endogenous growth 
literature, it presents a simple modified production function that explicitly includes the positive or negative 
externality effects generated by public investment. The paper estimates a dynamic labor productivity function for the 
1960-2007 period that incorporates the impact of  public and  private investment spending  and the labor force 
(rather than the rate of population growth). Single break (Zivot-Andrews) unit root and cointegration analysis suggest 
that (lagged) increases in public investment spending on economic infrastructureBas opposed to overall public 
investment spendingB have a positive and significant effect on the rate of labor productivity growth. In addition, the 
model is estimated for a shorter period (1970-2007) to capture the impact of foreign direct investment. The estimates 
suggest that foreign direct investment spending  has a lagged positive and significant impact on labor productivity 
growth,  while increases in the labor force have a negative effect .  Thus, the findings call into question the politically 
expedient policy in many Latin American countries, including Argentina during the 1990s and early 2000s, of 
disproportionately reducing public capital expenditures to meet reductions in the fiscal deficit as a proportion of 
GDP.  
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      The demise of Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Latin America has led many 
countries of the region to adopt an outward-oriented, market-based strategy of economic growth 
and development. Chile was the first major country of the region to adopt an outward-oriented 
strategy under the regime of Augusto Pinochet during the decade of the seventies, and after the 
onset and aftermath of the debt crisis in the early eighties, other major countries of the region 
began to follow suit by dismantling their state-owned enterprises and deregulating their 
economies.
1  Argentina began this process of economic stabilization and market-based structural 
reform in earnest following the country=s adoption of the AConvertibility Plan,@ a currency board 
system introduced in 1991 under the administration of Carlos Saul Menem.
2 
    The essential feature of this plan was to tie a new Argentinean peso to the dollar on a one-to-
one basis, thus eliminating the ability of the government to finance budget deficits via money 
creation while, at the same time, restricting the amount of pesos in circulation to the inflow of 
foreign exchange.  One of the most important accomplishments of the stabilization plan was to 
reduce dramatically the rate of inflation from 2,314 percent  in 1990 to 4.1 percent in 1994, and 
less that 1 percent in 1998!  The stabilization of the economy and the withdrawal of the state 
from key sectors of its economy, such as airlines, banking, electricity, gas, mining, steel, 
railways, telecommunications and petroleum, was welcomed by both domestic and (particularly) 
foreign investors, as well as free trade advocates, economists, and government officials working 






from US$ 1.84 billion to an all-time high of US$23.9 billion in 1999, before falling to US$11.7 
billion in 2000, and precipitously to 1.6  billion in 2003 as a result of the economic and financial 
debacle the economy experienced following the collapse of the currrency board in 2002 [see 
World Investment Report, 2005].   
    The stabilization of the Argentine economy during the nineties, however, was not achieved 
without significant economic and social costs, particularly in view of the impact of several 
external shocks that paved the way for the economic and financial debacle associated with the 
collapse of the Convertibility Plan in 2001-2002.  First, the country was buffeted by the 
contagion effects of the Tequila crisis in 1995-96 which generated massive capital flight, a 
liquidity crisis, and high real interest rates with their knock-on effects on the balance sheets of 
the banks and the real economy. Second, the Asian and Russian crises led to a significant flight 
of capital and, once again, a substantial rise in real interest rates and their adverse effects. Finally, 
the devaluation of the Brazilian currency (the real) in 1999 had a severe effect on the Argentine 
economy because close to 30 percent of its exports were destined to that country [see Weisbrot et 
al., 2002]. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the dollar continued to 
appreciate in real terms relative to the Euro and the Yen, thus further undermining the 
competitiveness of the Argentine economy given its hard peg to the dollar and its unrestricted 
mobility of capital. 
   To make matters worse, several prominent investigators have focused on the long-term 






adjustment measures implemented by the Argentine government, as well as other countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean [see Calva, 1997; Maia and Kweitel, 2003; Pastor, 1989; 
Stiglitz, 2003; Sunkel, 1994; Taylor 1997; Baer et. al., 2002; and Weisbrot, 2002 et. al.]. These 
programs often call for across-the-board cuts in public spending and tight restrictions on credit 
creation in order to meet stringent fiscal deficit targets, reduce the rate of inflation, and free 
resources to service the external debt.
3 In practice, critics contend that these stabilization and 
adjustment measures further undermine investor and consumer confidence because of their 
contractionary effect on the real economy and the rate of capital formation. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the disappointing and erratic behavior of Argentine private capital formation 
during the past two and a half decades.  Table 1 below shows that Argentina=s private investment 
as a proportion of GDP fell dramatically during the Alost decade@ of the 1980s,  reaching a low of 
9.4 percent in 1990 which amounted to less than half its level in 1980. Following the adoption of 
the Convertibility Plan it rose to a high of 19.1 percent in 1994, from which it fell again to 9.2 
percent in 2002 and a dismal 7.6 percent in 2003 as a result of the country=s economic crisis 
following the collapse of the currency board.
4 What is particularly worrisome about these figures 
is that most economists believe that it is absolutely essential for Argentina-- and other countries 
of Latin America-- to significantly improve and sustain its investment performance if it is going 
to lay the groundwork for rapid and sustained economic growth, as well as create future 
employment opportunities for its rapidly expanding labor force [see  Moguillansky, 1996; 






      A number of investigators have cited the dramatic fall in public investment in economic and 
social infrastructure, brought about by the need to meet the stringent fiscal deficit targets of the 
stabilization program, as one possible factor in explaining the poor investment performance of 
Argentina and other Latin American countries.  Table 1 shows that public investment spending in 
economic and social infrastructure as a proportion of GDP fell precipitously from 4.6 percent in 
1990 to barely 1 percent in 1994, only to rise to 2 percent during the 1995-99 period before 
falling again  in the 2001-2003 period to less than 1 percent.  Moreover, the average public 
investment spending on economic infrastructure for the 1990s is only a third of that of the 1980s 
and barely one fifth of the average level recorded during the 1970s.  The basic idea is that public 
investments in highways, bridges, sewerage systems, water supplies, and education and health 
services often generate substantial positive spillover benefits for the private sector by reducing 
the direct (and indirect) costs of producing, transporting, and delivering goods and services to 
consumers [see Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis, 2001: Aschauer, 1989; Cardoso, 1993; 
Devarajan and Zou 1994; Gramlich, 1994;Green and Villanueva,  1991; Khan and Reinhart, 
1990; Ram, 1996; Ramirez, 1998; Serven and Solimano, 1993]. If the complementarity 
hypothesis is correct, then the steep reductions in public capital formation experienced in 
Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America during the past decade and a half may further depress 
private investment spending and productivity growth.
5  To make matters worse, it may also 
undermine some or all of the long-term efficiency gains anticipated from the implementation of 






liberalization of trade [see Killick, 1995]. After all, the newly privatized firms in liberalized 
(open) markets will need adequate and reliable economic infrastructure in order to produce, 
transport, and market their goods and services in a cost-effective manner.
6 
    The economic rationale for increased public spending on these lumpy and  non-rival goods is 
by no means new or unique, for it can be traced back to book V of Adam Smith=s Wealth of 
Nations more than two hundred years ago.
7 What is new, however, is the incorporation of this 
basic idea into the endogenous growth literature and its empirical testing  in both developed and 
less developed nations as reliable data on public and private investment becomes available [see 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995].  For example, Aschauer [1989] has shown that in case of the 
United States and other OECD countries,  public sector spending on economic infrastructure 
raises the profitability and the productivity of private capital. Similarly, in the case of Latin 
America, Solimano and Serven [1993], as well as Cardoso [1993] and Green and Villanueva 
[1991], have found that a contraction in public-sector expenditure on gross fixed formation 
explained an annual drop in private investment equivalent to between 0.2 and 0.5 percent of 
GDP.  Ram [1996] in a recent pooled study of 53 developing countries for the 1973-90 period 
has generated estimates from a standard growth model which suggests that during the 1980s A... 
public investment seems more productive than private investment in most cases@ (p. 1376).   
Finally, Ramirez [1998] has shown that, in the case of Chile, a one-percentage point reduction in 
public investment as a proportion of GDP generates a ceteris paribus reduction in labor 






        In view of the importance and controversial nature of this topic, this paper analyzes  the 
impact of public investment spending  on economic growth and labor productivity in Argentina.  
The choice of Argentina is warranted for a number of reasons. First, Argentina is a large and 
strategically important country in Latin America.  This is a situation that promises to continue as 
a result of the country=s  participation in the important regional trade agreement named Mercosur. 
 Second, beginning with the Menem  administration (1989-1999) and continuing under the ill-
fated administrations of Fernando De La Rua and Duhalde (2000-2002), Argentina pursued a far-
reaching outward-oriented, market-based strategy of economic growth and development. An 
econometric study of the role of the Argentine state in the process of capital formation should 
prove both interesting and useful to development scholars and policymakers as they decide where 
to allocate scarce public funds to maximize the country=s growth potential.  Finally, Argentina is 
one of the few countries in Latin America that has reliable and disaggregated time-series data on 
public investment spending on economic and social infrastructure (i.e., excluding investment 
expenditures by SOEs  which are likely to crowd out private investment and output) going as far 
back as the decade of the sixties.  This data set thus enables researchers to test whether increases 
in government investment spending on economic infrastructure per se, rather than overall public 
investment expenditures, displace or promote private investment spending, economic growth, 
and (labor) productivity.              
     The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a conceptual framework for 






paper introduces a modified empirical counterpart to the model presented in the previous section, 
and discusses the nature and limitations of the data used in this study. Section IV presents single 
break (Zivot-Andrews) unit root tests and the estimates for the dynamic production relationship. 
Using cointegration analysis, this section tests whether there is a stable long-term relationship 
among the relevant regressors of the modified production function.  In so doing, this paper goes 
beyond other empirical studies of the complementarity hypothesis by addressing the important 
question of spurious correlation among the model variables.  The section is brought to a close by 
generating several error-correction (EC) models that are used to track the historical data on the 
growth rate of output  for the period under review.  The last section summarizes the paper=s 
major findings. 
II.  The Model. 
     On the supply side, the positive externalities generated by additions to the  public capital stock 
can be formalized by incorporating them in an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function of 
the following form [see Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995; and De Mello 1997] : 
                       Y = A φ [L, Kp , E] = A L
α K
β E
(1 - α - β)                                                           (1) 
where Y is real output, Kp is the private capital stock, L is labor, and E denotes the externality 
generated by additions of the public capital stock. α and β are the shares of domestic labor and 
private capital respectively, and A captures the efficiency of production.  Initially, it is assumed 







    The externality, E, can be represented by a Cobb -Douglas function of the type: 
                         E = [L, Kp, Kg
γ]
θ                                                                       (2) 
where γ and θ are, respectively, the marginal and the intertemporal elasticities of substitution 
between private and public capital.  Let γ >0, such that a larger stock of public capital generates a 
positive externality to the economy. If θ > 0, intertemporal complementarity prevails and, if θ < 
0, additions to stock of public capital crowd out private capital over time [see Jones, 1998]. 
     Combining equations  (1) and (2), we obtain, 
                         Y = A L
α +  θ(1 - α - β) Kp
β + θ(1 -  α - β) Kg
γθ(1 - α - β)                             (3) 
A standard growth accounting equation can be derived by taking logarithms and time derivatives 
of equation (3) to generate the following dynamic production function: 
                        gy = gA + [α + θ(1-α-β)]gL + [β + θ(1-α-β)]gKp  
                                    + [γθ(1-α-β)]gKg                                                         (4) 
where gi is the growth rate of i = Y, A, L, Kp, and Kg.  Equation (4) states that (provided γ and θ 
> 0) additions to the stock of public capital will augment the elasticities of output with respect to 
labor and capital by a factor θ(1-α - β). 
Preferences. 
    The demand side of the economy can be included into the model via the following 
intertemporal utility maximization framework: 
             Max u (t) = ∫
∞
o   u( c(t) ) e
-ρt L (t) dt                                                (5) 
                        s. t.  kp = A kp
β + θ(1-β) kg






where, for convenience, lower-case letters are defined in per capita terms and ρ is the discount 
rate, L(t) is the size of the family, c(t) is per capita consumption, and δ represents the rate of 
depreciation.  For convenience, the initial population is normalized to 1 so that the analysis in 
aggregate and per capita terms is the same. The instantaneous utility function of the 
representative consumer  is assumed to exhibit constant relative risk and can be written in the 
following general form: 
                        u(c(t)) = (c(t)
1-σ - 1) / (1- σ)                                                        (6) 
 σ denotes the relative risk aversion coefficient or the inverse of the elasticity of substitution 
between current  and future consumption; i.e., σ is an index of the representative consumer’s 
willingness to exchange current consumption for future consumption.  Letting u(c) = lnc, for 
simplicity, and solving the standard optimal control problem in equation (5), we obtain the 
following equation: 
                      ċ/c = 1/σ{A[β + θ(1-β)]kp
β + θ(1-β) -1 kg
γθ(1-β) - ρ}                           (7) 
Equation (7) can be interpreted as follows in the presence of intertemporal complementarity 
between public and private capital (i.e., θ > 0): the economy grows at a positive rate whenever 
the marginal product of capital, net of depreciation, can be kept above the rate of time preference 
(discount). The marginal productivity of private capital, in turn, is augmented and kept above the 
discount rate by additions to the stock of public capital.  Finally, the larger the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of current consumption for future consumption, as captured by the 






differently,  the sacrifice of current consumption is less costly to the representative consumer 
when present and future consumption are good substitutes (see Jones, 1998).   
III. Empirical Model.                        
        In the development literature it is often not possible to generate estimates of equations (3) 
and (4) above because of the poor quality of existing data for public and private investment 
spending, as well as the actual paucity of data on the labor force over a sufficiently long period of 
time.  Instead, investigators  have used proxies for key variables such as  the labor force and/or 
the stocks of private and public capital such as  population data rather than labor force data, or 
substituted investment data (as a proportion of GDP) for capital stock data [see Aschauer, 1989; 
Cardoso, 1993; Greene and Villanueva, 1991; and Lin, 1994].  Alexander [1994] has shown, 
however, that models using these proxies have to impose unduly restrictive assumptions (e.g., 
such as a fixed capital-output ratio) or unrealistic assumptions (a constant labor force 
participation rate) that can generate both misspecified relationships and significant measurement 
errors.  
      In the case of Argentina we are fortunate to have labor force data going as far back as 1960, 
but we do not have consistent estimates of the public and private capital stock series, or for that 
matter, reliable estimates of the rate of depreciation from which such a series could be generated. 
Researchers in the field of economic development have circumvented this problem by estimating 
a dynamic production which defines the relevant variables in terms of percentage growth rates, 






stocks. Following their lead, this study  includes the ratio of public and private investment 
spending to gross domestic product as alternative proxies. [The inclusion of GDP in the 
denominator rather than the capital stock is rationalized by the plausible assumption that there is 
a direct association between higher levels of output per capita and higher levels of capital per 
worker.]   The use of the ratio was also motivated by the fact that changes in effective demand 
will not only induce changes in investment(the numerator) but also output (the denominator); 
therefore the inclusion of the ratio of investment spending to output should attenuate the inherent 
volatility present in the capital growth series. Finally, for reasons explained in Section IV, the 
empirical model was estimated with changes in the investment ratios because these ratios were 
determined to be non-stationary in level form.   This study thus extends previous empirical work 
by estimating an empirical counterpart of the dynamic production function in equation (4) for the 
1960-2007  period without the FDI variable and between 1970 and 2007 with the FDI variable.
8   
     The most general formulation of the growth equation is given below,   
   Δy = α + β1Δl + β2Δ(ip ) + β3Δ(ig ) +  β4Δ(if) + β5Δ(cg) + β6 D1 + β7D2 + ε        (8) 
lower case letters denote natural logarithms, and  Δ denotes the change in the variable in 
question; y is real GDP (1993 pesos); l, as indicated above, refers to the labor force (thousands 
occupied); ip denotes the ratio of  private investment to GDP, while ig represents public 
investment spending on economic and social infrastructure as a proportion of GDP, viz., roads, 
bridges, and education--it therefore excludes investment expenditures by state-owned enterprises 






direct investment to GDP and  it is expected to have a positive effect because increased FDI 
flows are associated with a greater transfer of technology and managerial knowhow, learning-by-
doing, and greater market discipline; however, FDI  flows may also have a negative effect on the 
growth rate of a country if they give rise to substantial reverse flows in the form of remittances of 
profits and dividends and/or if the TNCs obtain substantial tax and other concessions from the 
host country [see Ram and Zhang, 2002]; cg is real government consumption expenditures as a 
proportion of GDP, and may directly or indirectly (via output taxes) crowd out private 
expenditures and thus affect output in a negative fashion;  D1 is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one for the crisis years, and 0 otherwise, while D2 equals 1 for the impact of the currency 
board, and 0 otherwise.  Finally, ε is a normally distributed error term. 
Data. 
      The data used in this study were obtained from official government sources such as the 
Direccion Nacional de Politicas Macroeconomica, Ministerio de Economia y Produccion 
(Ministry of Economy and Production, various issues) and the Instituto Nacional De Estadistica 
y Censos de la Republica Argentina (National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina).  
Other relevant economic data have been obtained from ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2007, and the International Finance Corporation  [Everhart and 
Sumlinski, 2001].   
        The coefficients of equation (8) represent the annual percentage change in real GDP 










focused on labor productivity so the dependent variable was  estimated as the growth rate in labor 
productivity by subtracting the growth rate in the labor force from the percentage change in GDP. 
 Defining the dependent variable in this manner reverses the expected sign of the labor variable 
because of diminishing returns to the labor input. The sign of β1 is anticipated to be positive in 
the GDP  formulation while, as indicated above, it is expected to be negative in the labor 
productivity specification. β2 is expected to be positive, while the sign of β3 can be positive or 
negative depending on whether increases in public in public investment  complement or 
substitute for private capital formation. Lags were included for this variable because of the 
delayed impact of government investment spending on economic infrastructure, private 
investment spending and private output growth.
9  The sign of β4 is also indeterminate because 
government expenditures on collective consumption goods such as food, housing, and salaries of 
public employees  may directly or indirectly (via output taxes and subsidies) crowd out private 
consumption expenditures and thus affect output in a negative fashion. β5 is expected to have a 
positive sign, but for reasons alluded to above, its sign could also be negative   [see Ram, 1996; 
and Ram and Zhang, 2002]. β6 is expected to be negative for obvious reasons, while  β7 is 
anticipated  to be positive. 
IV.   Unit Roots, Structural Breaks, and Cointegration Analysis. 
    Initially, conventional unit root tests (without a structural break) were undertaken for the 










deterministic and/or stochastic trend that renders them non-stationary; i.e., the variables have 
means, variances, and covariances that are not time invariant.  Engle and Granger [1987] have 
shown that the direct application of OLS or GLS to non-stationary data produces regressions that 
are mispecified or spurious in nature.  In view of this, this study tested the variables in question 
for a unit root (non-stationarity) by using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) with a lag 
length  automatically determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) [see Dickey-Fuller, 
1981]. 
     Table 2  presents the results of running an ADF test (one lag) for the variables in both level 
and differenced form under the assumption of a stochastic trend only, i.e., the test is run with a 
constant term and no time trend.
10  It can be readily seen that all the variables in level form are 
nonstationary; i.e., they appear to follow a random walk with (positive) drift [see Nelson and 
Plosser, 1982].  In the case of first differences, however, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is 
rejected for all variables (except one) at least at the 5 percent level.
11 Thus, the evidence 
presented above suggests that the variables in question follow primarily a stochastic trend as 
opposed to a deterministic one, although the possibility that for given subperiods they follow a 
mixed process cannot be rejected.
12    
    Although suggestive, the conventional results reported in Table 2 may be misleading because 
the power of the ADF test may be significantly reduced when the stationary alternative is true 










conclude that there is a unit root in the relevant series.  In order to test for an unknown one-time 
break in the data, Zivot and Andrews (1992) developed a data dependent algorithm that regards 
each data point as a potential break-date and runs a regression for every possible break-date 
sequentially. The test involves running three regressions (models): model A which allows for a 
one-time change in the intercept of the series; model B which permits a one-time change in the 
slope of the trend function; and model C which combines a one-time structural break in the 
intercept and trend (Waheed et. al., 2006).  Following the lead of Perron, most investigators 
report estimates for either models A and C, but in a relatively recent study Sen (2003) has shown 
that the loss in test power (1-β) is considerable when the correct model is C and researchers 
erroneously assume that the break-point occurs according to model A. On the other hand, the loss 
of power is minimal if the break date is correctly characterized by model A but investigators 
erroneously use model C.  In view of this, Table 3 reports the Zivot-Andrews (Z-A) one-break 
unit root test results for model C in level form along with the endogenously determined one-time 
break date for each time series.      
     As can be readily seen, the estimates reported in Table 3 for the series in level form are 
consistent with those in Table 2. For all of the series in question, Table 3 shows that the null 
hypothesis with a structural break in both the intercept and the trend cannot be rejected at the 5 
percent level of significance.
13 In addition, the Z-A test identifies endogenously the single most 










below shows visually the endogenously determined break-date for the GDP and public 
investment  series.
14  
     Having shown that the variables are integrated of order one, I(1), it is necessary to determine 
whether there is at least one linear combination of these variables that is I(0).  In other words, 
does there exist a stable and non-spurious (cointegrated) relationship among the regressors in 
each of the relevant specifications?  This was done by using the cointegration method proposed  
by Johansen and Juselius [1990].   The Johansen method was chosen over the one originally 
proposed by Engle and Granger [1987] because it is capable of determining the number of 
cointegrating vectors for any given number of non-stationary series (of the same order), its 
application is appropriate in the presence of more than two variables, and more important, the 
likehood ratio tests used in the procedure (unlike the ADF tests) have well- defined limiting 
distributions [see Harris, 1995]. 
      Table 4 below shows that the Johansen test for both the output and  labor productivity 
equations show that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector can be rejected at least at the 
one percent level; i.e., there exists a unique linear combination of the I(1) variables that links 
them in a stable and long-run relationship.
15  The lagged residual (error correction (EC) term) 
from the cointegrating equation, measuring the deviation between the current level of output 
(labor productivity) and the level based on the long-run relationship, was included in a set of EC 










equation (9) below: 
       Δy = α + β1Δl + β2Δ(ip)+ β3Δ(ig)+ β4Δ(cg) + β5Δ(if)  + δECt-1 +  ε                      (9) 
The coefficients (β=s) of the changes in the relevant variables represent short-run elasticities, 
while the coefficient, δ (< 0), on the lagged EC term obtained from the cointegrating equation in 
level form denotes the speed of adjustment back to the long-run relationship among the variables. 
 To conserve space, Table 5 below presents results only for the labor productivity growth rate 
relationship.
16   
    The results for eqs. (1)-(3) (for the longer time period without the FDI variable) suggest that 
the immediate impact of changes in the growth rate of the private investment ratio is positive and 
statistically (and economically) significant, while contemporaneous changes in employment 
growth have an (expected) negative impact on the growth rate in labor productivity.  Turning to 
the public investment variable, it can be readily seen that this variable has a positive and 
statistically significant effect when lagged two periods.
17 This result is not altogether surprising 
because the positive externalities generated from additions to the stock of roads, bridges and 
ports are likely to affect labor productivity with a lag. The estimate for the government 
consumption variable, on the other hand, has a small negative  and statistically insignificant 
effect on the rate of labor productivity growth. The estimates for the dummy variables in eqs. (2) 
and (3) suggest that the economic and financial crises that have buffeted Argentina have had a 










Convertibility Plan had a highly positive and significant impact. 
     As the theory predicts, the lagged EC terms are negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting, as in equation (3), that a deviation from long-run labor productivity growth this 
period is corrected by 30 percent in the next year. The results in Table 5 are also robust to the 
exclusion and inclusion of the dummy variables. Finally, the Chow breakpoint test suggested that 
the null hypothesis of no structural break could not be rejected for the economic crises years of 
1981 (p-value= .3762), 1989 (p-value=0.6821), and 1995 (p-value= .9127). 
   Turning to the results with the FDI variable in eqs. (4) and (5), they suggest that inflows of FDI 
have a positive (lagged) and significant effect on labor productivity growth. The other variables 
retain their statistical significance both with and without the dummy variables. Dummy variable 
2 was excluded from eq. (5) because its effect is already being captured, in part, by the inclusion 
of the FDI variable; the consumption variable was excluded from these specifications as well 
because it was statistically insignificant and, when it was included, it did not affect the estimates 
and significance of the other variables, but it did lower somewhat the performance of the overall 
model, as measured by the Adj. R2 and AIC criterion. 
     The EC models were also used to track the historical data on labor productivity growth in 
Argentina.  Table 6 below reports selected Theil inequality coefficients obtained from historical 
simulations of the productivity growth equations (3) and (5).  In general, the predictive power of 










The results reported in Table 6 meet this performance criterion, particularly for eq. (5) (the root 
mean squared errors (RMS) are relatively low as well).  The sensitivity analysis on the 
coefficients shows that changes in the initial or ending period did not alter appreciably  the 
predictive power of eq. (3) (it was not possible to conduct a  similar analysis for eq. (5) because 
of insufficient data points).  Figures 3 and 4 corresponding to equations (3) and (5), respectively, 
 provide further visual evidence of the models= ability to track the turning points in the actual 
series. ( DLPROD refers to the actual data and DLPRODF denotes the forecast.)   They show that 
the rate of  labor productivity growth was, in general, positive during the decade of the nineties, 
highly erratic in the seventies, and mostly negative during the Alost decade@ of the eighties. In 
fact, during the first half of the nineties there was a  sharp upward turn in output (labor 
productivity) growth, punctuated by a sharp drop in 1995 as a result of the Atequila effect@ 
associated with the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95, followed, in turn, by three years of positive 
growth, only to culminate in  a sharp contraction during the economic crisis years of 1999-2002.  
     In recent years, however, there has been an upward surge in productivity growth associated 
with the administration of Nestor Kirschner who took office in 2003 (see Fig. 1 below).  
Weisbrot and Sandoval [2007] attribute this favorable turn of events to a number of factors, not 
the least of which is the abandonment of the currency board, which had become a “strait-jacket 
with regard to monetary policy,” and the adoption of a stable and competitive real exchange rate 










they contend that the government’s adoption of unorthodox (pro-growth) policies, in the form of 
an accommodating monetary policy and a boost in public investment spending, have stimulated 
both internal demand and private capital formation (see Table 1). Finally, Weisbrot and Sandoval 
emphasize the Kirschner administration’s firm stance vis-à-vis the IMF in negotiating and 
restructuring Argentina’s defaulted external debt in 2005, which has significantly reduced the 
country’s debt-service ratio from 52.2 percent of GDP in 2005 to 36.9 percent in 2008, thus 
freeing scarce resources for its pro-growth policies (including public investment on economic 
and social infrastructure) [see Weisbrot, 2008, pp. 4-7; and Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2007, pp. 14-
16]   
 
V. Conclusion.                   
      Following the lead of the endogenous growth literature, this paper developed a simple model 
that explicitly includes the impact of the public capital stock  on the supply side  of a hypothetical 
economy.  The  discussion showed that if significant complementarities are present between 
public and private capital (i.e., if a positive externality is present), then diminishing returns to the 
private inputs can be prevented or postponed indefinitely.  The conceptual model laid the 
groundwork for the empirical analysis of labor productivity growth in the Argentine case for the 
1960-2007 period in Sections III and IV.   Several key findings were obtained. 










intercept and trend indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for the 
relevant series in level form, but can be rejected in first differences. Second,  the Johansen 
cointegration method revealed that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 
five percent level, thus suggesting that the I(1) variables have a unique and stable relationship 
that keeps them in proportion to one another in the long run. This is an important finding because 
previous empirical studies have applied the OLS method directly to nonstationary variables in 
level form, thus generating spurious or misspecified regressions. Third, the cointegrating 
equations were used to generate a set of EC models that reconcile both the short and long-run 
properties of the variables included in the output and labor productivity relationships. As the 
theory predicts, the EC models have negative and statistically significant error correction terms, 
suggesting that deviations from long-run labor productivity (output) growth are corrected in 
subsequent periods.   
     Fourth, the individual EC estimates indicated that the growth rate of  private and public 
investment as a proportion of GDP, as well as the growth rate in the  FDI ratio, have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the growth rate of labor productivity, while the growth rate 
in the labor force has a negative impact. Fourth, the reported Theil inequality coefficients for the 
selected EC models suggested that they were able to track and simulate the turning points of the 
historical series in labor productivity relatively well.  










labor productivity growth was mostly positive, while during the decade of the seventies the 
annual estimated rate of output growth became erratic, culminating in a  marked decrease (often 
negative rates) during the decade of the eighties--the so-called Alost decade of development.@  
The labor productivity growth estimates for the first half of the nineties did  reveal a robust  
increase, thereby suggesting that the currency board’s taming of inflationary pressures and the 
opening of the economy to foreign direct investment had a positive effect [see Weisbrott and 
Sandoval, 2007]. 
     From a policy standpoint, the findings in this paper are important because they suggest that  
cash-strapped governments of Latin America, such as the Argentine one, can maximize the 
growth potential of their economies by directing scarce resources to investments in economic and 
social infrastructure and away from collective consumption goods that compete directly with 
those provided by the private sector. In addition, the findings suggest that attracting Abolted 
down@ capital in the form of FDI inflows is likely to have a beneficial effect on labor productivity 
growth.  These investments, through a positive externality effect, are likely to increase the 
marginal productivity of the private inputs directly (as well as indirectly), thereby increasing 















Albala-Bertrand, J.M. and E.C. Mamatzakis. 2001. AIs Public  Infrastructure Productive?              
          Evidence from Chile@ Applied  Economic Letters, 8 (March): 195-199. 
 
Aschauer, David A. 1989. AIs Public Expenditure Productive.@  Journal of Monetary                  
            Economics, 24:177-200. 
 
Baer, Werner , P. Elosegui and A. Gallo, 2002. AThe Achievements and Failures of Argentina=s 
Neo-Liberal Economic Policies.@ Working Paper  
 
Barth, J.R. and J.J. Cordes. 1980. ASubstitutability,  Complementarity, and the Impact of              
            Government Spending on Economic Activity.@ Journal of Economics and                       
            Business, 3(Spring): 235-42. 
 
Boswoth, Barry P. et. al., 1994. The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges. 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
 
Bouton, L. and Mariusz A. Sumlinski. 1999. ATrends in Private Investment in Developing 
Countries 1995: Statistics for 1970-1998.@ Working Paper No. 41. Washington, D.C.: 
International Finance Corporation. 
    
Cardoso, Eliana. 1993. APrivate Investment in Latin America.@ Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 41 (July): 833-848. 
 
Calva, Jose L. 1997. AMercado y Estado en la Economia Mexicana: Retrovision y                         
            Prospectiva.@Problemas del Desarrollo, 28 (April/June): 71-102. 
 
Charemza, W.W. and D.F. Deadman. 1997. New Directions in Econometric Practice: General 
to Specific Modelling, Cointegration and Vector Autoregression. Cheltenhaum, U.K.: 
Edward Elgar Publishers. 
 
De Mello, L.R., Jr., 1997. AForeign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and Growth: A 
Selective Survey,@ Journal of Development Studies, 34 (October): 1-34. 
 
Devarajan, S. and Zou, H. 1994. ADoes Public Investment Promote Economic Growth?@ The 











Engle, R.F. and C.W.J. Granger. 1987. ACointegration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation, and Testing.@ Econometrica, 55: 251-76. 
 
 
Everhart, S.S. and Sumlinski, M.A., 2001. ATrends in Private   Investment Spending in                 
           Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970-2000,@ Working Paper No. 44. Washington,     
           D.C.:  The World Bank, International Finance Corporation
 
Granger, C.W.J. and Newbold, P. 1974. ASpurious Regression in  Econometrics.@ Journal of       
            Econometrics 2: 111-120.  
 
Gramlich, E.M. 1994. ADoes Public Capital Crowd Out Private Capital.@ Journal of Economic 
Literature, 31: 1176-1196. 
 
Green, Joshua and Delano Villanueva. 1991. APrivate Investment in Developing Countries: An 
Empirical Analysis.@ IMF Staff Papers, 38 (March):  
 
Harris, Richard. 1995. Using Cointegration Analysis in Econometric Modelling. New York: 
Prentice-Hall. 
 
Johansen, Soren and K. Juselius. 1990. AMaximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference on 
Cointegration with Applications to the Demand for Money.@ Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 52 (May): 169-210. 
 
Jones, Charles I. 1998. Introduction to Economic Growth. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc. 
 
Kahn, M.S. and C. M. Reinhart. 1990. APrivate Investment and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries.@ World Development, 18 (January): 19-27.   
 
Killick, T. 1995. IMF Programmes in Developing Countries. London: Routledge. 
 
Lee, J. and M.C. Strazicich. 2003. “Minimum Lagrange Multiplier Unit Root Test with Two              












Maia, Jose L. and M. Kweitel, 2003. AArgentina: Sustainable Output Growth After the                  
          Collapse,@ Working Paper. Buenos Aires:  Direccion Nacional de Politicas                        
           Macroeconomicas, Ministerio  de Economia.  
 
Meller, Patricio. 1991. The Latin American Development Debate. San Francisco: Westview 
Press. 
 
Moguillansky, Graciela. 1996. AThe Macroeconomic Context and Investment: Latin America 
since 1980.@ Cepal Review, 58 (April): 79-94. 
 
Nelson, C., and C. Plosser. 1982. ATrends and Random Walks in Macroeconomic Time Series: 
Some Empirical Evidence and Implications.@ Journal of Monetary Economics, 10, 
1982: 139-162. 
 
Pastor, Manuel. 1989. ACurrent Account Deficits and Debt Accumulation in Latin America:         
             Debate and Evidence.@ Journal of Development Economics, 31 (1): 77-97. 
 
Phillips, P.C.B., and P. Perron, 1988. ATesting for a Unit Root in   Time Series Regressions.@       
             Biometrika, 75 (June): 335-346. 
 
Prager, Jonas. 1992. AIs Privatization a Panacea for LDCs? Journal of Developing Areas, 26 
(3): 301-322.  
 
Perron, P. 1988. "Trends and Random Walks in Macro-economic Time Series Further Evidence 
From A New Approach, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12, 297-332. 
 
Ram, R. 1996. AProductivity of Public and Private Investment in  Developing Countries: A           
           Broad International Perspective.@ World Development, 24 (August): 1373-1378. 
 
Ram, R. and Zhang, K.H., 2002. AForeign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Evidence 
from Cross Country Data for the 1990s,@ Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 51: 205-215. 
 
Ramirez, Miguel D. 1998. ADoes Public Investment Enhance Labor Productivity Growth in 
Chile? A Cointegration Analysis,@ North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 9 (1): 45-65. 










Rodrik, D. 1999. The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness 
Work. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. 
 
Serven, L.  and A. Solimano1993. AEconomic Adjustment and Investment Performance in 
Developing Countries: The Experience of the 1980s,@ in Strategies for Growth After 
Adjustment. The Role of Capital Formation. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Sen, A. 2003. “On Unit Root Tests when the Alternative is a Trend Break Stationary Process,”    
            Journal Of Business and Economic Statistics, 21: 174-184. 
 
Stiglitz, J., 2003. AWhither Reform? Towards a New Agenda for Latin America,@ Cepal Review, 
No. 80, August: 7-38.  
 
Taylor, Lance. 1997. AThe Revival of the Liberal Creed--the IMF and the World Bank in a 
Globalized Economy.@ World Development, 25 (February): 145-152. 
 
United Nations, 2007. World Investment Report, 2007.  Switzerland: United Nations. 
 
United Nations, 2005. World Investment Report, 2005.  Switzerland: United Nations. 
 
Waheed, M., A. Tasneen, and G. Saghir. 2006. “Strcutural Breaks and Unit Roots: Evidence f      
            from Pakistani Macroeconomic Time Series,” Munich Personal RePec Archive, Paper   
            No. 1797, December: 1-18.  
 
Weisbrot, M., A. Cibils, and D. Kar., 2002. AArgentina Since  Default: The IMF and the               
           Depression,@ Center for  Economic and Policy Research, Briefing Paper                         
           (September): 1-25. 
 
Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2007. AArgentina=s Economic Recovery:  Policy Choices and                   
           Implications,@ Center for Economic  and Policy Research, Briefing Paper (December):  
           1- 20. 
 
            World Bank. 1994. World Development Report 1994. Washington, D.C.: Published for the World        
          Bank by Oxford  University Press. 
 
           Zivot, E. and D. Andrews. 1992. “Further Evidence  on the Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the       










TABLE 1. Argentina: Investment as a Share of GDP (in percent), 1980-2007. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year                 Private Investment        Public Investment 
 
1980                        19.2                      6.1 
 
1982                        16.6                      5.2 
 
1984                        14.9                      5.0 
 
1986                        13.2                      4.3 
 
1988                        14.4                      4.3 
 
1990                         9.4                      4.6 
 
1991                        12.7                      1.9 
 
1992                        14.9                      1.8 
 
1993                        18.1                      1.0 
 
1994                        19.1                      0.8 
 
1995                        15.8                      2.2 
 
1996                        16.1                      2.0 
 
1997                        17.3                      2.0 
 
1998                        17.9                      2.0 
 
1999                        16.1                      1.8 
 
2000                        15.4                      1.0 
 
2001                        12.1                      0.9 
 
2002                         9.2                      0.7 
 
2003                         7.6                      0.8 
 
2004                        10.5                      1.3 
 
2005                        12.9                      1.9 
 
2006                        13.2                      2.5 
 




1970-1979                   13.6                      9.1 
1980-1989                   15.0                      4.9 
1990-1999                   15.7                      1.6  
2000-2007                   12.0                      1.5 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source:  IFC,  Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries, Statistics for 1970-2000. 
Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2001; and M.E.P., Argentina: Sustainable Output Growth After the 











TABLE 2. Argentina: Unit Root Tests for Stationarity, Sample Period 1960-2007. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variables        Levels       First Difference     5% Critical Value
1     1% Critical 
Value
     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
ln(Y)            -1.36            -5.32**             -2.94               -3.59 
 
 
ln(Y/L)          -1.78            -3.39*              -2.94               -3.59 
 
 
lnL               0.66            -5.84**             -2.94               -3.59 
 
 
lnIp             -1.24            -6.51*              -2.94               -3.59 
 
 
lnIg              -2.67            -5.60**             -2.94               -3.59 
 
 








1MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
2Unit root 
tests for the FDI variable were undertaken for the 1970-2005 period. *Denotes 
significant at the 5 percent level; **denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 




































TABLE 3.  Zivot-Andrews One-break Unit Root Test, Sample Period 1960-2007   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variables                            Levels                      Break Year                  5% Critical Value
a         1% Critical Value 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ln(Y)             -3.37            1980              -5.08            -5.57   
 
 
In(Y/L)           -3.32            1980              -5.08            -5.57   
 
 
lnL               -4.36            2000              -5.08            -5.57 
 
 
lnIp                    - 4. 43            1979              - 5. 08            - 5. 57    
 
 
lnIg                   -3.69            1991              -5.08            -5.57 
 
 
























































TABLE 4. Johansen Cointegration Rank Test (Trace), 1960-2007. 
 
 
A. Series: lnY, lnL, LnIg , and lnIp. 
 
Test assumption: No Linear deterministic trend in the data. 
   
 
  Eigenvalue     Likelihood Ratio     5% Critical Value          No. of CE(s) 
 
    0.510             56.126              54.08                     None 
     
    0.333             26.847              35.19                   At most 1 
 
    0.136             10.217              20.26                   At most 2 
 
    0.098              4.229               9.17                   At most 3 
       
 
B. Series: ln(Y/L), lnL, lnIg , and lnIp. 
 
Test assumption: no linear deterministic trend in the data.   
 
  Eigenvalue      Likelihood Ratio     5% Critical Value         No. of CE(s) 
   
    
    0.505             28.809               28.09                    None 
     
    0.281             13.526               22.29                  At most 1 
 
    0.149              6.610               15.89                  At most 2 
 
    0.077              3.300                9.16                  At most 3 
    
 
  Normalized Cointegrating Vector; coefficients normalized on ln(Y/L) in parenthesis.   
 
  Vector      ln(Y/L)     lnL       lnIg        lnIp      Constant 
 
    1.         1.000     6.413    -1.367     -1.976    -59.347 
                        (1.121)   (0.257)    (0.533)    
 











TABLE 5. Argentina: Error Correction Model; Dependent Variable is: (ΔlnYt - ΔlnLt),  
         1960-2007. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                OLS Regressions 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variables           (1)             (2)           (3)          (4)           (5)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Constant             0.01           0.02          0.02         0.02         0.02 
                    (1.89)**       (2.00)**      (4.56)**     (2.00)**      (2.64)** 
 
ΔlnLt                -0.47          -0.63         -0.65        -0.56        -0.81 
                   (-2.39)**      (-3.34)**     (-4.51)**    (-1.84)**     (-2.44)**  
   
 
Δln(Ip/Y)t             0.22           0.17         0.15          0.22          0.18  
                    (7.85)**       (4.12)**     (3.79)**     (5.64)**     (7.51)**  
 
Δln(Ig/Y)t-2          0.04           0.03          0.03         0.03          0.04 
                    (3.17)**       (2.59)**      (2.84)**    (4.97)**     (2.57)** 
 
Δln(If/Y)t-3           ---            ---          ---          0.01          0.02  
                                                             (1.75)**      (2.00)** 
 
Δln(C/Y)t             ---           -0.01         ---          ---           --- 
                                   (1.13)                             
 
 
ECTt-1                -0.30          -0.26        -0.22        -0.31        -0.32 
                   (-3.85)**       (-4.25)**   (-2.93)**    (-4.98)**    (-6.02)**  
 
DUM1                  ---           -0.04       -0.04         ---         -0.04 
                                   (-3.47)**   (-3.64)**                 (-2.63)** 
 
DUM2                  ---            ---         0.02         ---           --- 




2              .67               .72          .76          .74           .80 
 
S.E.               .028              .026         .025         .026          .023  
D.W.               2.03              1.99         2.03         2.12          2.05 
AIC               -4.14             -4.36        -4.34        -4.19         -4.42 
SIC               -3.93             -4.02        -4.04        -3.87         -4.05 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios and the number of asterisks denotes  
significance as follows: * at the 10 percent level and ** at least at the 5  
percent level. AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion and SIC is the  










TABLE 6. Argentina: In-Sample Forecast Evaluation for Error Correction Models. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                 Equation (3)           Equation (5) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
                                            Sample: 1960 2007       Sample: 1970-2007    
                                             -----------------       ----------------  
Root Mean Squared Error (RMS)                      0.0244                 0.0231 
 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE)                          0.0192                 0.0193 
 
Theil Inequality Coefficient (TIC)                 0.3008                 0.2499 
 
Bias Proportion (BP)                               0.0000                 0.0071 
 
Variance Proportion (VP)                           0.0971                 0.0586 
 
Covariance Proportion (CP)                         0.9019                 0.9335 
 
                                             Sample: 1960 1999  
                                             ----------------- 
RMS                                                0.0246                  --- 
 
MAE                                                0.0189                  ---  
 
TIC                                                0.3011                  --- 
 
BP                                                 0.0000                  --- 
 
VP                                                 0.0996                  --- 
 
CP                                                 0.9017                  --- 
 
                                             Sample: 1970 2007 
                                             ----------------- 
RMS                                                0.0245                  --- 
 
MAE                                                0.0194                  --- 
 
TIC                                                0.3124                  --- 
 
BP                                                 0.0001                  --- 
 
VP                                                 0.1130                  ---  
 
CP                                                 0.8968                  --- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 































Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test   
   
Sample: 1960 2007     
Included observations: 48     
Null Hypothesis: LRGDP has a unit root with a structural 
                                break in both the intercept and trend 
Chosen lag length: 1 (maximum lags: 4)   
Chosen break point: 1980     
         
              t-Statistic  Prob.    
Zivot-Andrews test statistic  -3.367150   0.052984   
1% critical value:   -5.57     
5% critical value:   -5.08     
10% critical value:   -4.82     
         





























Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test 
 
Sample: 1960 2007   
Included observations: 48   
Null Hypothesis: LGINVGDP has a unit root with a structural 
                                break in both the intercept and trend 
Chosen lag length: 0 (maximum lags: 4) 
Chosen break point: 1991   
       
            t-Statistic  Prob.  
Zivot-Andrews test statistic  -3.692069   0.001786 
1% critical value:   -5.57   
5% critical value:   -5.08   
10% critical value:   -4.82   
       


























1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
DLPRODF= In-Sample Forecast of Labor Productivity Growth Rate.

































DLPRODA= Labor Productivity Growth Rate, 1970-2007.
DLPRODF= In-Sample Labor Productivity Forecast.  
 
 

























Notes                         
 
                                                 
1. For an informative and balanced discussion of the economic benefits and social costs associated with 
Chile=s market-oriented policies, see Bosworth, Dornbusch, and Laban [1994]. 
2. Argentina=s privatization, liberalization, and deregulation program is discussed and analyzed in Baer et. 
al. [2002], Petrecolla [1993],  Randall [1997], and Weisbrot et. al. [2002].  
3.Weisbrot [2002] reports that in 2002 the IMF demanded that the Argentine government enact spending 
cuts of 10 percent across-the-board, in addition to a 30 percent reduction in outlays for goods and services 
and a 13 percent cut in salary and pensions for government employees (p. 13).  
4.It should be mentioned that during the 1990s only a handful of countries, notably Chile and Costa Rica, 
have managed to record investment ratios comparable to those before the onset of the debt crisis in the 
early 1980s. See Glen and Sumlinski [1996, pp. 16-19]. 
5. This paper only addresses the direct output effects of increasing public investment spending. It ignores 
the impact of public investment spending on the relative prices that private firms face for key inputs and 
services. To the extent that increases in public investment on economic and social infrastructure reduce the 
relative price of energy, transportation, and human capital to firms in the private sector, it will, ceteris 
paribus, reduce their prime costs, raise profit margins, and spur further investment. 
6. It can also be argued that the public sector need not provide these public goods directly; the goods can 
be contracted out to the private sector in accordance with government regulations and guidelines. In fact, 
many governments in Latin America (including Mexico) are in the process of awarding concessions to 
private firms to produce and provide quasi-public goods and services.  However, as Prager [1992] correctly 
observes, relatively little or no attention has been given to the monitoring or supervision cost 
of outsourcing public works projects. If these costs are substantial, particularly in the medium run, the bias 
in favor of privatizing these types of expenditures is removed.     
7. For further details see Smith [1976; originally 1776], Book V, Ch. I, Part III, pp. 244-253. 
8. Data for the FDI ratio were not available for Argentina prior to 1970 [see Maitan and Keitel, 2003; and 
World Investment Reports, 2005 and 2007].  
9.Another important reason for including lags is that it reduces, to some extent, the criticism of reverse 
causation from the rate of growth in GDP to the growth rate in public investment spending, i.e., the 
economic argument which suggests that public investment is a normal good whose rate of growth will 
decline when the rate of output growth ( or productivity) declines and tax revenues fall and increase during 










                                                                                                                                                             
10. A stochastic trend is one where the random component of the series itself, say variable xt, contributes 
directly to the long run pattern of  the series, either upward or downward. However, in the case of a 
deterministic trend the deviations from the non-stationary mean over time are quickly corrected. It is also 
possible for the variable in question to display both a stochastic and deterministic trend process over time. 
For further details see Charemza and Deadman, [1997, pp. 84-92]. 
11. The order of the lag length was determined by applying both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SIC).  For all the variables in this study, the ADF tests 
with one lag showed the lowest value for both the AIC and SIC criteria.  
12. This study also performed an ADF test (one lag) on the variables in logarithmic form with a 
deterministic trend. The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for 
any of the variables in level form with a deterministic trend, suggesting that the variables in question do 
not exhibit a deterministic time trend throughout the period under review. In other words, the common 
practice of detrending the data by a single trend line will not render the data in level form stationary 
because the trend line itself may be shifting over time [see Harris 1995; and Charemza and Deadman, 
1997].   When the ADF test is applied to these variables in first differences under the assumption of a 
constant and deterministic time trend, most of the variables become stationary at the five percent level of 
significance (in one case at the 10 percent level) 
13.  The Z-A one-break point unit root test was also performed for the relevant time series in differenced 
form under the assumption of model C and the null hypothesis was rejected at the 5 percent level or lower 
in all cases.  
  
14.  The analysis undertaken in this study only tests for the presence of a single endogenously determined 
structural break. In a recent paper, Lee and Stazicich (2003) show that when there are, in fact, two 
structural breaks in the data, assuming erroneously that there is only one can result in a loss of power of the 
test.   
15. The variables in question are cointegrated with and without a deterministic trend.  The results are 
available upon written request.  
16. The EC regressions for the output equation are essentially the same as those for the labor productivity 
regressions (except for the reversal in sign of the labor force variable) because they are a parametric 
transformation of one another (the results are available upon request).    
17. The order of the lag length was determined by applying both the AIC and SIC criteria.  